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How is your proposal WTO-compliant? This is a ques-tion that farm groups must
be prepared to answer when they
travel to Washington looking for
increased subsidies. That an inter-
national trade agreement should
be playing such a prominent role
in shaping U.S. farm programs may
be surprising. But this prominence
is likely to continue as long as the
United States remains committed
to expanding world trade through
negotiated agreements.
Many people both inside and
outside of agriculture do not real-
ize that the United States put strict
limits on its ability to subsidize U.S.
farmers. It did this to win agree-
ment from other countries to limit
their own subsidies. Because we
are a net exporter of agricultural
products, U.S. producers should
expect to see a gain from such
trade-expanding agreements. But
the downside of the agreement—at
least from the point of view of U.S.
producers—is that Congress no
longer has complete freedom in its
design of farm programs.
WHAT IS THE WTO?
The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is the successor organiza-
tion to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its mis-
sion is to provide a mechanism to
resolve trade disputes between
countries and to expand interna-
tional trade by lowering existing bar-
riers and preventing new ones. The
WTO is an institution with staff mem-
bers, but WTO is also used as short-
hand to refer to sector-level trade
agreements that exist within the
WTO. Agriculture has such an agree-
ment. It is called the URAA (Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture).
In the URAA, domestic subsidy
programs are classified according
to their impact on trade flows. The
classifications are often described
in terms of colored boxes:  “green”
for those programs that have mini-
mal impacts on trade, “amber” for
programs that have important im-
pacts, and “blue” for programs that
are explicitly allowed in the agree-
ment. The URAA places no limits on
green and blue box programs. Ex-
penditures under amber box pro-
grams are limited. The analogy of a
traffic stoplight adequately de-
scribes what can be done to sup-
port domestic producers under the
WTO. Countries can continue
(“Go”) all green and blue box pro-
grams at any level of funding. Coun-
tries may continue to use amber
box policies as long as the expendi-
tures on them do not exceed set lev-
els (“Proceed with caution”).
Outlawed policies are placed in a
“red” box (“Stop”).
Detailed rules determine the
classification of domestic subsidy
programs. Blue box policies are pro-
duction-limiting policies that base
payments on fixed yields and acre-
age. Payments must be limited to 85
percent of the base level of produc-
tion. The old U.S. target-price-defi-
ciency payment program that
existed before 1996 was a blue box
program. Green box policies are
those that have minimal trade im-
pacts. Payments from green box
policies cannot be linked to current
production and/or prices.
Limits on amber box expendi-
tures are based on a country’s level
of support over a base period. The
countries that signed the URAA
agreed to limit amber box spending
to a level at or below their level of
support during the base period. De-
veloped countries (for example,
the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia) and confederations (the Eu-
ropean Union) agreed to 20
percent reductions in their amber
box limits by 1999. Within the am-
ber box, programs can be ex-
empted from the limits if their
payment amounts are considered
too small to count. These exemp-
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tions are referred to as de minimis
exemptions.
For developed countries, a 5
percent de minimis rule is used.
For crop- or product-specific sup-
port, a policy can be declared de
minimis if the expenditures under
the policy are less than 5 percent
of the value of production for the
commodity. For non-crop- or non-
product-specific support, all such
policies can be declared de mini-
mis if total expenditures under all
of the policies are less than 5 per-
cent of the total value of agricul-
tural production in the country.
WHAT BOX FOR CURRENT
U.S. PROGRAMS?
Farm groups want their policy pro-
posals to be classified as green box,
because that would mean that Con-
gress would have complete freedom
to fund the program at any desired
level. However, few programs can be
classified as green box. To see why,
we can examine the classification of
U.S. farm programs for the 1995-
1997 marketing years, the only years
that the United States has submitted
reports to the WTO.
PFC Payments
The Production Flexibility Contract
(PFC) payments, which are one cor-
nerstone of the 1995 FAIR (Federal
Agriculture Improvement and
Reform) Act, fall in the green box.
PFC eligibility requirements and the
amount of payments are based on
historical production patterns over
a fixed base period. Current produc-
tion decisions (even the decision
not to produce at all) do not affect
the size of the payment. Given that
there is no link between current pro-
duction and PFC payments, these
payments should have no effect on
future production and therefore are
not trade distorting.
Price Supports and Marketing Loans
Price support and marketing loan
programs fall in the amber box be-
cause payments depend directly on
current production and prices.
Given this link, the programs influ-
ence future production decisions
and have trade-distorting effects.
For example, current loan rates
have fueled expansion of soybean
acreage relative to corn and wheat
acreage. The larger supply has
decreased world soybean prices,
expanded U.S. exports, and reduced
other countries’ soy exports.
Clearly this direct effect on trade
flows means that LDP payments fall
in the amber box.
Crop Insurance Payments
The other major U.S. program
currently available is the crop
insurance program. Government-
provided insurance or safety net
programs are green box if
1. they insure income only from
agricultural sources;
2. they insure losses only in excess
of 30 percent of average gross
income (or an equivalent
amount of net income) where
average income is determined
by past income levels; and
3. indemnity payments combined
with payments from a natural
disaster relief program do not
exceed 100 percent of the
producer’s total loss.
 Net crop insurance payments
(indemnities less the producer pre-
mium) clearly fall in the amber box
because coverage above 70 percent
is allowed and indemnities are not
based on average past income levels.
Emergency Assistance
Over the last three years, the federal
government has substantially in-
creased agricultural subsidies with
annual emergency assistance pack-
ages. These packages included market
loss assistance (MLA) and crop loss
assistance payments for several com-
modities. The crop loss assistance
payments were constructed to be ex-
empt from WTO limits. However, there
is some question as to whether the
MLA payments are amber or green
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box. Clearly, Congress made the pay-
ments in response to low market
prices. This suggests that they are am-
ber box. But the payments are based
on the PFC formulas that are green
box, which suggests that they should
be classified the same way. After all,
there is no formula linking the pay-
ments to current market prices. Any
link to current prices is derived from
interpreting the intent of Congress.
There is also some question
about whether the payments are
crop-specific or non-product-
specific. The structure of the pay-
ments is non-product-specific
because current production has
no impact on the payments. But the
payment rates are crop-specific.
How the MLA payments are classi-
fied makes a big difference because
their classification determines
whether or not the United States
exceeded its amber box limits.
HAS THE U.S. MET ITS WTO
COMMITMENTS?
Figure 1 shows that whether the
U.S. has met its WTO commitments
depends on whether the MLA pay-
ments are classified as amber or
green box and whether they are
classified as crop-specific or non-
crop-specific payments. The blue
line in Figure 1 shows the WTO am-
ber box limits for the United States.
The white line shows actual (for
1996 and 1997) or projected (after
1997) amber box payments if the
MLA payments are classified either
as green box or as non-crop-specific
payments. The two classifications
give the same result because as
non-crop-specific payments, the
MLA payments can be character-
ized as de minimis, and do not
count toward amber box limits.
They would be classified as de mini-
mis because they do not exceed 5
percent of the value of total agricul-
tural production.
However, as shown by the black
line in Figure 1, if the MLA payments
are classified as amber box and
crop-specific payments, then the
United States has exceeded its am-
ber box commitments. The differ-
ence arises because the payments
for each crop would be compared to
the value of each crop to determine
if they could be classified as de mini-
mis under the 5 percent rule. Our
calculations indicate that they ex-
ceed the 5 percent rule, so they
would count toward the amber box
limits. As shown, this interpretation
leads to higher amber box pay-
ments, adding enough to push the
United States past its limits in both
1999 and 2000.
WHAT BOX FOR PROPOSED
PROGRAMS?
As Congress attempts to design a
new farm bill, judgments will have to
be made regarding how new or ad-
justed policy complies with the am-
ber box commitments shown in
Figure 1. Policies that increase or re-
balance the marketing loan rates
change programs that are already
marked as product-specific amber
box spending programs. Given most
price projections for 2001 and 2002,
such changes would likely lead to
higher amber box payments and
push the United States even closer to
its limit. The often-proposed flexible
fallow program would also be consid-
ered product-specific amber box
spending, even though it has produc-
tion-limiting features (like blue box
programs), because the payments
are triggered by current prices.
The Supplemental Income Pay-
ments (SIP) proposal is a product-spe-
cific amber box program because
payments are triggered by shortfalls
in current crop-specific prices or pro-
duction. The Commission on 21st
Century Production Agriculture’s
countercyclical proposal is non-
product-specific as it looks at income
across eight crops. But our interpreta-
tion of the URAA indicates that it also
would be considered amber box be-
cause current prices and production
from the eight crops are used to deter-
mine the overall amount of payments.
New policies that include environ-
mental payments could also fall into
the amber box if the payment exceeds
the additional cost or loss of income
that producers face in implementing
the requirements of the program.
Most current farm bill proposals
keep the existing programs in place.
This implies that any additional ex-
FIGURE 1. Amber box commitments and spending levels under
alternative classification of market loss assistance payments
Continued on page 7
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penditure from these proposals
would add to the U.S. amber box
spending (barring de minimis exemp-
tions). Therefore, the probability of
the United States exceeding its WTO
domestic support limit would in-
crease under these proposals. For
example, if the SIP proposal with a
95 percent coverage level had been
in place instead of the MLA pay-
ments, then the United States would
have exceeded the amber box spend-
ing caps in 1999. Figure 2 shows the
estimated payments and the extent
to which we would have exceeded
the limits.
As the URAA now stands, the goal
of having a new countercyclical farm
program conflicts with the goal of re-
ducing trade-distorting policies. Most
variations on a countercyclical farm
program would fail to qualify for a
green box exemption, due to their
very countercyclical nature. After all,
how can a program be countercyclical
if it cannot be based on current prices
and yields? Efforts to construct a
green box countercyclical farm pro-
gram would require a redefinition of
the meaning of “countercyclical.”
Adding a new amber box counter-
cyclical program might require the
elimination of one or more existing
policies. Such a move could be justi-
fied because both the price support
and crop insurance programs provide
countercyclical support. A new pro-
gram could substitute quite effectively
for either program.
WHY THE WTO?
Why might it make sense for the
United States to place limits on its
ability to subsidize agriculture?
There are two reasons. The first is
that as a large exporter of agricul-
tural products, U.S. farmers will ben-
efit from increased agricultural
trade. Of course, some producers
who compete directly with imports,
such as producers of sugar, dairy
products, and peanuts, would face
increased competition from freer
trade, but, overall, U.S. producers
would be big winners from expanded
trade. Thus, it makes sense for the
United States to limit its subsidies in
exchange for limits on other coun-
tries’ subsidies. This is the standard
explanation for why the WTO agree-
ment makes sense.
The second reason why it might
make sense for Congress and the ad-
ministration to negotiate limits is
that it strengthens the hand of those
who believe increased subsidization
of agriculture is not in the best inter-
est of either agriculture or the coun-
FIGURE 2. Total amber box spending with a 95 percent SIP program
try as a whole. That is, WTO limits
place an upper bound on the level of
“coupled” support that can be given
to agriculture. Coupled support
means farmers’ production deci-
sions are influenced by the program
as well as by market signals. Not sur-
prisingly, policymakers find it easier
to say no to farm groups if there is
some external constraint that they
can point to. Congress and farm
groups are finding that the WTO
agreement is one such constraint, a
constraint that works to limit the
effects of farm programs on domes-
tic and world markets. 
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